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NOTES
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA-The task of selecting a form
of association for several persons wishing to join in the conduct of a business
venture seems, to the layman, to present no serious problem. He considers the
choice to lie only between partnership and corporation. The lawyer, on the
other hand, will appreciate the difficulties presented. This is especially true in
Pennsylvania, where the variety of forms available for association is exceptionally
large. Assuming that partnership is undesirable to the prospective associates, it
does not follow that they must incorporate. The particular circumstances of a
given situation may make more advisable one of six intermediate forms.
An analysis of the reasons for preferring the corporation to the partnership
will indicate the characteristics which should be present in the particular inter-
mediate form to be selected. The advantages of incorporation not afforded by
partnership are said to be sixfold.' The corporation is an association with per-
petual succession of members: the doctrine of delectus personarum has no appli-
cation. Thus, the termination of the association on the death, withdrawal,
bankruptcy or incapacity of one of the members-a risk of every partnership-
is avoided. The control of the corporate enterprise is vested by law in a re-
stricted group, eliminating the risk and confusion attendant upon the power of
every member of a partnership to bind the association. The corporation may
own property, and may sue and be sued in the corporate name, without naming
all the associates. A shareholder of the corporation may bring an action at
law against another shareholder or against the association to settle disputes in-
volving association matters; he is not restricted, as are partners, to proceed-
ings in equity for an accounting. The anonymity afforded by the corporate
name is preferred by many to the personal flavor of the partnership name.
Finally, the liability of the shareholders of a corporation is limited-probably the
most important single advantage afforded by this forn.
The privilege of carrying on business in the corporate form is not bestowed
by the state without restrictions. It will be granted only to a group of three or
more persons, at least two-thirds of whom are citizens of the United States.2 and
who bring into the enterprise at least five hundred dollars in cash.' The execution
of certain of the formalities prerequisite to the completion of incorporation neces-
sitates a delay which, at times, may prove inconvenient. 4  Certain formalities
burden the operation of the business.5 Units of ownership must be divided
according to specifications. 6 Activities of the corporation must be conducted by
a board of at least three directors elected for fixed periods,7 and the transaction
of business is under the supervision of designated officers. 8 Failure to observe
the required formalities entails, inter alia, the risk that the corporate form will
be ignored by the courts and that unlimited personal liability will be imposed.
'The distinctions advanced here have been borrowed from the analysis in WARmu ,
CORPORATE ADVANTAGES WITHOUT INCORPORATION (1929) 17 et seq.
2 Act of May 5, 1933, No. io6, § 201.
11d. §204 (8).
'Id. § 2o5, requires advertisement in the county legal newspaper three days prior to filing
of the articles. Since Philadelphia is the only county in which the legal newspaper is a daily
rather than a weekly, and since corporate existence begins only when a certificate is issued
after filing the articles (§§ 206 and 207), delays of a week to ten days are possible in perfect-
ing organization.
See Act of May 5, 1933, No. io6, arts. 4, 5, 8, and §§ 304, 308, 309, 318.
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In addition, the corporation must pay tribute for its privileges. Pennsyl-
vania exacts certain fees incident to organization 0 and a bonus for permission
to exercise corporate privileges;1 it levies a tax on the transfer of units of
ownership " and a tax on the capital stock.1 2 The federal government imposes a
tax on the capital stock, 13 a tax on the creation of the units of ownership,' 4 a
tax on their transfer 15 and a series of levies on income. The latter, in addition
to an income tax,16 taxes any excess over twelve and one-half per cent. net which
may be earned on capital stock in a given year,'" as well as the distribution of the
profits to the shareholders.'" If the corporation desires to transact business
within any foreign state, it is subject to fees and taxes levied by that state in
return for registration and permission there to transact business.' 9 The price
exacted for the privilege of using the corporate form, when compared with the
tax-free nature of the partnership,"& bears heavily upon all corporations; to the
small corporation it is almost strangulatory.21
If participation by the public is to be solicited, the prestige of the corporate
form, as well as the undoubted formal safeguards surrounding it, urge its use.
However, private companies which desire no public participation may seek other
possible forms of association, less expensive or more suitable to the conditions.
There is no statute in -Pennsylvania which provides expressly for the creation of
'Act of May 17, 1933, No. 120, fixes the fee for filing articles of incorporation at $3o.
To this may be added a fee of $5 for reserving a corporate name and advertising costs of
about $ii.
"PA. STAT. AN-. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 72, § 1822 (a) imposes a bonus of one-Afth of
one per cent of the authorized capital stock.
I PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 72, § 2o41 taxes transfers of capital stock at two
cents per $IOO par value or two cents per no par value share.
PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 72, § 1871 taxes the capital stock of Pennsylvania
corporations 5 mills per dollar annually.
'The National Industrial Recovery Act § 215 (a), 48 STAT. 207 (1933), 26 U. S. C. A.
§ 3761 n. (Supp. 1933), establishes a tax of $i per $IOOO "adjusted declared value" of the
corporation's capital stock.
" 47 STAT. 272-5 (1932), 26 U. S. C. A. § 9Ol (2) (Supp. 1932) taxes creation of capital
stock and similar interests two cents per $20 face value up to $Ioo and thereafter IO cents
per $ioo.
'47 STAT. 273 (1932), 26 U. S. C. A. §9o (3) (Supp. 1932) taxes transfers of capital
stock 4 cents per $IOO par value or 4 cents per no par value share selling below $2o and 5
cents per no par value share selling above $2o.
"047 STAT. 177 (1932), 26 U. S. C. A. § 3013 (1928) sets the corporate income tax rate at
134%.
" The National Industrial Recovery Act § 216, 48 STAT. 208 (1933), 26 U. S. C. A.
§ 3761 n. (Supp. 1933), levies a tax of 5% on all profits earned in a year in excess of 12/47%
of the value of the capital stock declared in accordance with § 215, supra note 13. Although
the passage of Amendment XXI to the Federal Constitution and its ratification presages the
discontinuance of all taxes under the N. I. R. A., as provided for by § 217, 48 STAT. 208
(1933), 26 U. S. C. A. 3761 n. (Supp. 1933), nevertheless, as to Pennsylvania corporations,
any advantage gained will probably be lost with the possible adoption of the income tax
presented to the forthcoming special session of the legislature.
1N. I. R. A. § 213, 48 STAT. 206 (I933), 26 U. S. C. A. § 3761 n. (Supp. 1933) levies an
excise tax of 5% on all corporate dividends declared.
"In Pennsylvania the capital stock tax is applicable to the property within the state of
foreign corporations registered to do business in Pennsylvania. See PA. STAT. ANN. (Pur-
don, 193o) tit. 72, § 706.
' Partnership income is taxed to the individual partner in his proportionate share. U. S.
TREAS. REG. 77, art. 9oi; KLEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAxATIoN (1929) 1120 et seq. No special
taxes are imposed.
"The tax cost of forming a $ioooo corporation is $71 (fee $30; advertising $11; bonus
$20; original issue tax on capital stock $io). It is then subject to annual state tax of $5o
and, assuming a profit of 6% before taxes and no capital gain or loss, federal taxes of $143
(income tax $8o; capital stock tax $io; dividend tax on distribution of $470, $23). The
annual tax thus amounts to Io of the capital and close to 33% of the assumed earning
power of that capital.
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small business corporations as does the English Private Companies Act. Penn-
sylvania does, however, authorize two statutory forms of association, the Part-
nership Association and the Registered Partnership, which, although they approx-
imate the corporation, do not involve the many burdens imposed by the use of the
corporate form.
The Partnership Association 22 is the older of these two forms. By statutory
provision, its organization may be perfected without delay.23  The duration of
the association is limited to twenty years, with the privilege of renewal for
additional twenty-year periods. 24 There is no requirement for either a minimum
capital or share structure. Although the shares are freely alienable, in absence
of a by-law, the transferees do not, ipso facto, become members of the association.
They must be elected to membership by the then members of the association. If
they fail of election, they may recover, under statutory procedure, the appraisal
value of the shares purchased.25 Management of the association is vested in an
annually elected board of at least three managers who are also the officers and
whose salaries are limited by the statute. The power to contract for the associa-
tion in amounts exceeding five hundred dollars may be exercised only by at least
two of the managers. -G The remaining corporate advantages of holding property
and suing in the association name,2 7 settlement of association disputes at law, and
limited liability, are granted to this association by statute.
2 8
The privilege of limited liability, afforded by the statute, can be assured to
the members of a Partnership Association only by a literal compliance with the
formalities set forth in the Act.2 9 The federal courts, in applying the diversity
of citizenship rule, treat these associations as partnerships. 3 0  Although there is
a decision that these associations may not exercise their "corporate" privileges
outside the state,31 a recent case permits it.2
The Registered Partnership " is a variation of the Partnership Association.
It differs only in that it may be formed by two or more members, may exist for
an unlimited period, and may be managed in the same manner as a partnership,
with all members participating and with no special formalities requisite to con-
tracting.
4
While it is true that the taxes levied upon these associations are the same
as those imposed upon the corporation, 2 the advantages of the former deserve
-PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, r93o) tit. 59, §§ 341-461.
' All that is required is the recording of the articles, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, ig3o)
tit. 59, §341, and that the capital be paid in, Health Ins. Co., (Opinion Att'y-Gen.) 28 C. C.
599 (Pa. 1903). Cf. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, i93o) tit. 59, § 243.
2- PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, i93o) tit. 59, §§ 441-4.
"5 Id. §383.
See id. §§ 4o-4.
Id. § 361.
SId. § 381.
'Eliot v. Himrod, io8 Pa. 569 (2885) (no subscription list book); Sheble v. Strong,
128 Pa. 315, i8 Atl. 397 (1889) (failed to describe sufficiently property taken for shares);
PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, I93O) tit. 59, § 382.
' Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U. S. 449, 2o Sup. Ct. 69o (igoo).
"Edwards v. Warren Linoline Works, 168 Mass. 564, 47 N. E. 502 (1897) (suit in the
association name).
' Hill-Davis Co., Ltd. v. Atwell, 215 Cal. 444, io P. (2d) 463 (932) (owning property
in association name). Although this was a Michigan Partnership Association, the Michigan
act, Mica. ComP. LAWS (1929) §§ 9909-28, was copied from the Pennsylvania act, and
they are practically identical. See Rouse, Hazard & Co. v. Donovan, io4 Mich. 234, 238, 62
N. W. 359, 360 (2895).
PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 59, §§ 241-321.
M'Id. § 263.
",The federal definition of "corporation" for taxing purposes includes these associations.
U. S. TREAs. REG. 77, arts. I313, 1316. As to state taxes, they are liable for: bonus, PA.
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emphasis. Most important is the increased facility for keeping the association
closed to outsiders. Although one of the theoretical advantages of corporate
organization is the elimination of the effect of the doctrine of delectus person-
arunm, nevertheless, in the case of small corporations, the facts upon which the
doctrine is founded often exist. As a result, these corporations desire to restrict
the alienability of their shares, and can achieve this only by printing a restriction
upon the share certificates.3 6 It is perhaps advisable to add a collateral contract.
Despite all these precautions, litigation frequently results. As has been noted,
the statutes creating these associations provide a less cumbersome method of
accomplishing this result. The procedure for reimbursing the transferee of
shares of a Partnership Association where the transferee is not elected to mem-
bership is reasonably expedient; the method provided in the case of Registered
Partnerships is entirely satisfactory.37  Both organizations are attractive because
of the despatch with which they may be formed. The Partnership Association
provides a means for controlling the power to contract, such control being desir-
able when the associates are strangers. The Registered Partnership eliminates
almost entirely the formalities of management so burdensome to the corporate
form, and by removing the necessity for a third manager and organizer, insures
the active members, if only two in number, against a recalcitrant straw party.38
The corporation, the Partnership Association, and the Registered Partner-
ship afford all members limited liability. This privilege, obtained at great expense
and continued inconvenience, is by no means necessary or advisable to members
of all business associations. A stringency of credit, often at the very inception
of the organization, may oblige members to waive limitations upon their liability:
they must become accommodation parties to commercial paper or guarantors of
accounts, safeguards without which few will advance the necessary funds. It
may occur that one of the members, due to the small amount of possible loss or
to his confidence in the success of the enterprise, is willing to be unlimitedly
liable. If some associates will waive limited liability, and if others do not insist
upon participating actively in the management of the business, a Limited Part-
nership may be advisable.
The Limited Partnership, like the other intermediate forms discussed, is a
creature of statute.39 The use of this form avoids all of the taxes imposed upon
the corporation.4" There must be at least one general partner in the firm, and
if there are more, the articles may preserve the association against the risk of
dissolution on the death or incapacity of one.41 The general partners are subject
to the rules of ordinary partnership law. The limited partner, on the other hand,
possesses a freely alienable interest in the firm, and his liability is limited to the
agreed contribution. This latter privilege is forfeited if he takes an active part
STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 72, § 1822 (f) ; capital stock tax, Commonwealth v. Sander-
son & Robb Imp. Co., 3 Dauph. 116 (Pa. 1881), Limited Partnership Taxation (Opinion
Att'y-Gen.) 28 C. C. 582 (Pa. 19o3) ; stock transfer tax, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930)-
tit. 72, § 2041.
PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 393o) tit. 15, § 315. A by-law imposing the restriction is
sufficient if endorsed on the share certificate. Act of May 5, 1933, No. io6, § 613 (A).
'PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, I93O) tit. 59, §§ 270-I provide for an annually established
book value which is binding for the ensuing year on members 'or their transferees. The
Partnership Association's stock is valued by a court appraiser, supra note 25.
'For a case involving a straw party see Sturgeon v. Apollo Oil & Gas Co., Ltd., 203
Pa. 369, 53 Atl. 189 (I9O2).
PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 59, §§ 171-228.
4o U. S. TREAs. REG. 77, art. 1315 defines a limited partnership of this form as a partner-
ship for purposes of taxation. It is liable for neither bonus nor capital stock tax in Penn-
sylvania. Commonwealth v. Biddle, 2 D. & C. 705 (Pa. 1923).
' PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, I93O) tit. 59, § 204.
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in the management. 42 He is afforded additional protection by restrictions on the
powers of the general partners and by rights expressly conferred upon himself.
43
The fact that the personal credit of the general partner may not be high is of
little importance if he has a reputation for honesty and ability, since the capital
contributed by the limited partners will establish as high a credit as that which
could be commanded by a corporation of equal capitalization.
The associations mentioned above comprehend the statutory forms available
in Pennsylvania. There are, however, several common law devices which offer
one or more of the corporate advantages. The sub-partnership device 44 is avail-
able to an investor who trusts implicitly those who will manage the enterprise and
who does not desire either to become a member of the association or to exercise
any modicum of control over its management. This relationship is established
by the investor's contracting with a member of the partnership, in consideration
of sharing in his profits in the venture, to indemnify him for any losses he may
sustain through his activity as a partner, and perhaps to supply him with the
required capital. The dogma is that the investor becomes a partner of the
member but not a member of the partnership. 4  Whether this is strictly true and
whether all the rights and duties of partnership exist as between the investor and
the partner does not appear from the cases. However, it is fairly well established
that the privilege of creditors of the partnership to proceed against the investor
is derivative, in that it depends upon the existence of rights in the partner against
the investor.46  It would appear, therefore, that if the latter by his contract
limited the extent of his liability to the partner, the limitation would be good as
against the creditors of the partnership. Thus, the investor would share in the
profits of the venture with limited liability for its losses. Of course, no corporate
taxes apply to this purely contractual relationship.
Another common law device is the Business or Massachusetts Trust. The
Massachusetts Trust is an ordinary trust: the trustees are empowered actively
to engage in and manage a business for the benefit of the cestuis que trustent
(often the settlors) who hold fully transferable trust certificates which represent
an equitable interest in the trust property. Although there are no decisions on
the question, if the trust is within the rule against perpetuities and the rule against
restraints on alienation, there is no reason why such a trust should not be valid
in Pennsylvania.4 7 The power of the settlors to limit the liability of the cestuis
depends upon the amount of control over the project reserved to them. If the
trustees are vested with absolute power, the cestuis may be as free from liability
Id. §191.
Id. § 193 debars the general partner from doing any act in contravention of the cer-
tificate, doing any act which would make it impossible to carry on the business of the part-
nership, confessing judgment against the partnership, dealing with partnership property for
other than partnership purposes, admitting other general partners or limited partners unless
permitted by the certificate, continuing business on the incapacity or withdrawal of a general
partner unless permitted by the certificate. The limited partner has a right to examine the
books, have an accounting, compel a dissolution, and share in the profits. He may also deal
with the association on the same footing as outsiders. See §§ 194, 197, 200 (4).
" See Rowley, Risk Evasion Through Sub-partnership (1930) 30 Co. L. REv. 674.
'For collection of cases following the leading case of Ex parte Barrow, 2 Rose 252
(Eng. 1815), see Rowley, supra note 44, at 674 n.
"' See Rowley, supra note 44; Keystone Nat. Bank v. Randle, I C. C. 354 (Pa. 1886).
In re Haines & Co.'s Estate, Grove's Appeal, I76 Pa. 354, 35 Atl. 237 (1896), would seem to
lend its support to this view.
a The following Pennsylvania cases recognized trusts organized elsewhere: Small v.
Smith, 294 Pa. 163, 143 Atl. 786 (1928) ; National Shawmut Bank v. Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co., 12 D. & C. ii (Pa. 1929).
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as they would be in an ordinary trust ;48 but if the cestuis control or have the
power to control the trustees, the trend is away from permitting any limitation
on their liability.
45
Whether tax statutes are applicable to these trusts depends upon the language
of the acts. The Federal Revenue Act of 1932 includes in its definition of cor-
porations all "associations" carrying on business; that test covers Massachusetts
Trusts." The only cases in which it was held that trustees are not engaged in
doing business are those involving trusts for the management and sale of real
estate and distribution of the profits.5 The availability of this device as a tax-
free method for handling real estate transactions is, for the present, assured. If
by analogy the rule may be extended to cover all cases where the trustee merely
collects and distributes profits, the trust would be established as a useful means
of financing other types of business associations.
52
The common law Joint Stock Company is very closely connected with the
Massachusetts Trust. This organization is not to be confused with modern
statutory associations bearing the same name. Both courts and text-writers
admit the existence of a type of common law partnership which, by contract of
the members, had freely transferable shares and hence perpetual succession.58
Since it could not hold property in the association name, a trust was often included
in the articles in order to facilitate the transaction of business and the trustees
were given power to manage some of the business affairs. 54 When this occurs,
it becomes difficult to distinguish a Massachusetts Trust from a Joint Stock
Company.
The exact status of these associations in modern law is difficult to determine.
Although there are no recent Pennsylvania cases involving Joint Stock Companies,
no statutes have been passed which would eliminate them, and their continued
existence as a legal possibility must therefore be presumed. It is safe, however,
to enumerate several legal attributes of these legal curiosities. Membership is
obtainable only by express contract and will not be implied even for the benefit
of creditors.55 Limited liability is not available to members unless written into
the contracts of association.56 Inter se the members are partners in the eyes of
the law.57  Since such associations are construed to be partnerships, and since
" Goldwalter v. Oltman, 21o Cal. 4o8, 292 Pac. 624 (193o) ; Darling v. Buddy, 318 Mo.
784, I S. W. (2d) 163 (1927) ; see Byrnes v. Chase National Bank, 225 App. Div. 102, 232
N. Y. Supp. 225 (1928).
"Frost v. Thompson, 219 Mass. 36o, lo6 N. E. IOO9 (1914); Marchulonis v. Adams,
97 W. Va. 517, 125 S. E. 340 (1924). See Note (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 11o3.
W4 7 STAT. 289 (1932), 26 U. S. C. A. §4111 (Supp. 1932); U. S. TR.As. Reg. 77, art.
1314; Commissioner v. Atherton et al., Trustees, 5o F. (2d) 74o (C. C. A. 9th, 1931), aff'g
19 B. T. A. 1172 (1930). It is also required that the trust be in quasi-corporate form. Gui-
tar Trust Estate v. Commissioner, 25 B. T. A. 1213 (1932) ; Shepherd Syndicate v. Commis-
sioner, 26 B. T. A. io62 (1932).
' Lansdowne Realty Trust v. Commissioner, 50 F. (2d) 56 (C. C. A. Ist, 1931), rev'g
2o B. T. A. Iig (193o) ; Tyson et aL v. Commissioner, 54 F. (2d) 29 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931),
rev'g Zenith v. Commissioner, 21 B. T. A. 656 (193o).
This device was used to finance a limited partnership in Crehan v. Megargel, 234 N. Y.
56, 136 N. E. 296 (1922).
' Roberts v. Anderson, 226 Fed. 7 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915) ; Phillips v. Blatchford, 137 Mass.
510 (1884) ; Kramer v. Arthurs and Nicholson, 7 Pa. 165, 171 (1847) ; Oliver's Estate, 136
Pa. 43, 6o (5890); BALLENITNE, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1927) 15; 1 FLETCHER, CYCLO-
PEDIA OF CORPORATIONS (perm. ed. 1931) 53.
"Moss's Appeal, 43 Pa. 23 (1862); Oliver's Estate, supra note 53; Pittsburg Wagon
Works' Estate, 204 Pa. 432, 54 Atl. 316 (19o3).
'Beaver's Adm'r v. McGarth, 50 Pa. 479 (1865); Fletcher v. Gawanese Tribe, 9 Pa.
Super. 393 (1899).
' Hedge & Horn's Appeal, 63 Pa. 273 (1870).
'See Matter of Fry, 4 Phila. 129 (Pa. i86o).
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Section 93 (2) of the Uniform Partnership Act "' compels dissolution of a part-
nership at the will of a member irrespective of contract, the legal incidents which
would follow a shareholder's withdrawal and the effect which would be given
the words used supply interesting material for conjecture.59 The express inclu-
sion of "Joint Stock Companies" in most corporation tax statutes leaves little
doubt that they are taxable as corporations. Since they exist under the common
law and not by virtue of statute, their ability to transact business freely within
other states must be assumed.
The nature of the use of forms of business associations is such that it is
practically impossible to draw any useful 'generalizations from the foregoing
examination. The choice of a form can be made only after a careful investiga-
tion of all the facts as well as of the personalities of the prospective associates.
However, emphasis should be placed upon the utility of the Registered Partner-
ship as a convenient substitute for incorporation in small enterprises. Although
no statistics have been compiled, the number of corporations in which there are
but one or two shareholders who are also the owners and managers must be con-
siderable. In all such situations the Registered Partnership offers relief from
the formalities incident to corporate existence, formalities with which the asso-
ciates may fail to comply, whether unwittingly or through ill-conceived cleverness.
Non-compliance may bring the corporate structure, erected as a protection, tum-
bling about their ears. Every attorney should add to his list of possible forms
of association the Registered Partnership and the Massachusetts Trust, the former
as a relief from formalities and the latter as a saver of taxes. Closer acquaint-
ance with their utility is urged.
L.I.M.
LEGALITY OF RACE SEGREGATION IN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS-It iS
well, before considering the legal aspects of a problem primarily social, to empha-
size the fact that the proper sphere of the law is not to impose impractical ideals
upon a reluctant people. The law as an effect of social causes does best when it
expresses an acknowledged right and provides an adequate remedy for its breach.
As has been said in reference to the segregation of races in schools:
"The attempt to enforce social intimacy and intercourse between the
races, by legal enactments, would probably tend only to embitter the preju-
dices . . ."±
Out of the chaos of the Civil War came the Fourteenth Amendment impos-
ing upon the courts of the nation the delicate task of administering to a proud
South the ill-defined ideals of a crusading North. The problem of negro educa-
tion, formerly negligible,' was to become tremendously important both to govern-
ments and to the race. In refusing the more extreme implications of the Amend-
ment, the conservative courts pointed out that education was and always had
been a matter entirely for state government, and that the right to it was not at
' PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, i93o) tit. 59, §§ 1-151.
"'See Fairman v. Ogden Gas Co., io6 Pa. Super. I3O, 161 Atl. 635 (1932) (Uniform
Partnership Act applied).
'People ex tel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y. 438, 448 (1883).
'Before the Civil War, negro education was apparently no more than an apprenticeship
by private contract. See Rachel v. Emerson, 6 B. Mon. 280 (Ky. 1845) ; Baker v. Winfrey,
15 B. Mon. 499 (Ky. 1854) ; Lyne v. Lyne, Ky. Dec. 299 (1803).
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all a "privilege and immunity" of a citizen of the United States.3 However, the
status of citizenship with which he was so justly endowed has brought to the
negro well-defined rights not only under the Federal Constitution, but also under
the laws of the several states. The nature of these rights in the field of public
and private education is worthy of investigation.
A brief survey of the control a state may exercise over schools must serve
as a preface to a consideration of the constitutional problems involved. A state
may place certain restrictions upon public school teachers as state employees,4
determine what subjects are to be taught in public schools,' and decide matters
of pedagogical policy.6 Further, because of the admitted "public interest" in all
education, state funds may be used to provide texts for private schools,' and
compulsory attendance enforced in public schools or approved private schools.'
However, under the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment, courts invalidate stat-
utes which require all children to attend only public schools, 9 or which prohibit
the teaching of foreign languages in private schools 10 as unjustified regulations
of the profession of teaching. These decisions lead directly to a consideration of
the constitutionality of state statutes which demand the segregation of races in
private schools.
Courts differ in applying the Fourteenth Amendment to the teaching pro-
fession. It has been said of one indicted for teaching foreign languages:
"His right thus to teach and the right of parents to engage him so to
instruct their children, we think, are within the liberty of the Amendment.""
In a case involving race segregation in private schools, it was said:
"The right- to impart instruction, harmless in itself or beneficial to those
who receive it, is a substantial right of property-especially, when the serv-
ices are rendered for compensation. But even if such right be not strictly
a property right, it is, beyond question, part of one's liberty as guaranteed
against hostile state action by the Constitution of the United States." 12
An examination of the extant statutes discloses that three states, Florida,
13
Tennessee,"4 and Kentucky,"5 make it a penal offense for teachers and pupils to
' State v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198, 209 (1871) ; Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36, 49 (1874);
Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 344 (1874).
'Seattle High School v. Sharples, 159 Wash. 424, 293 Pac. 994 (1930) (teachers pro-
hibited from joining a union); Commonwealth v. Herr, 229 Pa. 132, 78 At. 68 (igio)
(teachers prohibited from wearing insignia) ; cf. Chechock v. Inlependent School Dist., 210
Iowa 258, 228 N. W. 585 (193o).
Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S. W. 363 (927) (organic evolution).
'Prohibiting fraternities is valid. Waugh v. Miss. Institute, 237 U. S. 589, 35 Sup. Ct.
720 (1915) ; Bradford v. Board of Education, 18 Cal. App. 19, 121 Pac. 929 (1912) ; cf. Steele
v. Sexton, 253 Mich. 32, 234 N. W. 436 (1931). Bible reading valid if not compulsory.
People v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 46, 255 Pac. 61o (1927) ; Kaplan v. Independent School Dist.,
171 Minn. 142, 214 N. W. 18 (1927).
'Cochran v. Louisiana Board of Education, 281 U. S. 370, 50 Sup. Ct. 335 (1930).
' State v. Hoyt, 84 N. H. 38, 146 Atl. 170 (1929) ; State v. Williams, 56 S. D. 370, 228
N. W. 470 (1929); cf. Gillin v. Board of Education, 25o Fed. 649 (E. D. Pa. 1918) (uphold-
ing a conviction for failure to send to school a child who was refused admission because he
was not vaccinated).
9 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 45 Sup. Ct. 571 (1925).
'Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 43 Sup. Ct. 625 (1923) ; Bartels v. State, 262 U. S.
404, 43 Sup. Ct. 628 (923) ; Farrington v. Tokushige, ii F. (2d) 710 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926).
' Meyer v. Nebraska, supra note IO, at 40o, 43 Sup. Ct. at 627.
'Harlan, J., dissenting, in Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45, 67, 29 Sup. Ct. 33,
39 (19o8). The material quoted, which was not contrary to the holding of the majority, was
mentioned with approval in Farrington v. Tokushige, supra note IO, at 713.
FLA. ComP. LAws (1927) §§ 81o7, 8112.
"TENN. CODE (1932) §§ 11395, 11396, 11397.
' Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 193o) § 4526a.
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be of different races, or for both races to be taught in the same building in private
schools. It is of great practical significance to note that these apparently uncon-
stitutional laws, with one exception, have not been challenged in appellate courts."0
The one exception is the historic case of Berea College v. Kentucky.17 Berea
College was reincorporated in 1899 to educate and "to promote the cause of
Christ", admitting both races for instruction. Later, a statute was passed pro-
viding
. .. that it shall be unlawful for any person, corporation or asso-
ciation to maintain or operate any college, school or institution where persons
of the white and negro races are both received as pupils for instruc-
tion . .. " 18
The conviction of the college under this statute was appealed to the Supreme
Court of the United States, where, without any reliance upon a reasonable "police
power",
... the judgment . . . was affirmed solely upon the reserved author-
ity of the legislature of Kentucky to alter, amend, or repeal charters of its
own corporations ... ." "I
The great pains taken in the majority opinion to demonstrate that the statute
could be construed separably so as to apply only to corporations is persuasive of
its unconstitutionality as applied to persons or associations of a non-corporate
nature.20 The implications of the case were repudiated in a more recent decision
where the Court pointed out-that the statute which unlawfully regulated a private
school had not specifically expressed the intention to revoke the charter, and in the
absence of such expression, the statute was unconstitutional. 2' With due toler-
ance toward a delicate situation, it is difficult to appreciate even the social justi-
fication for a law which makes it a crime for both races to join by their own
initiative in educational pursuits.
The problem of the private school is relatively simple; the more important
and difficult issue involves schools maintained by the states for general public
education. Although it is true that federal law does not compel a state to educate
its citizens, too much confusion has resulted from an easy reliance upon the
principle that school regulation is entirely within the "discretion" of the state
governments. 22 Constitutional provisions subject to state discretion are no pro-
tection at all, and as expressed in Yick Wo v. Hopkins:
10 The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 69 Fifth Ave., New
York City, informs the writer that two white Catholic Sisters indicted in St. Augustine for
teaching colored children, were released on habeas corpus by Circuit Court Judge Gibbs on
the ground that the statute, supra note 13, was unconstitutional. A similar result is said to
have been obtained with a Missionary School, April IO, 1896.
'7Supra note 12.
Supra note i5.
"Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 79, 38 Sup. Ct. 16, 2o (917), where the Court in de-
claring unconstitutional municipal zoning by race, repudiated the inference that the Berea
case was authority for the state's power to control private institutions to segregate races.
'The Court said, supra note 12, at 54, 29 Sup. Ct. at 34, "But it is unnecessary for us to
consider anything more than the question of its validity as applied to corporations. The
statute is clearly separable and may be valid as to one class while invalid as to another. .. ."
How far the Court was ready to go to avoid the real issue is indicated at 56, 29 Sup. Ct. at
35, "While the terms of the present charter are not given in the record, yet it was admitted
on the trial that the defendant was a corporation . . .' Justice Harlan, who dissented
(Day, J., concurring), pointed out that there was no evidence of a legislative intent to change
or revoke the corporate charter, or to make any distinction between schools on the basis of
incorporation.
2 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra note 9, at 535, 45 Sup. Ct. at 574.
' See Cumming v. Board of Education, infra notes 46 and 47. It is at times difficult to
determine the real basis of a decision. In the Berea College case, supra note I2, at 58, 29
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". .. the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or
the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life,
at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where
freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." 23
It becomes necessary to determine those rights of the negro to public educa-
tional facilities which attach to his constitutionally created status as a citizen
and taxpayer. The Fourteenth Amendment provides unqualifiedly that no
state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." 24 Do these terms make unlawful separate negro schools?
Even before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was pointed
out that the mere separation of races did not imply, of itself, the inequality or
inferiority of one race.2 5 Innumerable decisions under the Amendment have
consistently justified and proclaimed the legality of separate negro schools.2" In
one of the earliest decisions in the federal courts, the fundamental rule was stated
as follows:
"Any classification which preserves substantially equal school advan-
tages does not impair any rights, and is not prohibited by the Constitution
of the United States. Equality of rights does not necessarily imply identity
of rights." 27
The Supreme Court of the United States had no opportunity to consider the
issue until 1927 in the case of Gong Lurn v. Rice 28 where, in upholding the legal-
ity of separate schools, the Court pointed out that they had long been maintained
by Congress in the District of Columbia .
2
The result of these decisions is that all the southern states require that
negroes be taught separately, 0 although most northern states refuse to take
advantage of the rule and teach both races together. 1 It has been urged that such
separation stigmatizes the colored race and accentuates racial prejudice. Unfor-
Sup. Ct. at 36, the Court declared unconstitutional that part of the statute that required col-
ored schools to be twenty-five miles from white schools because it was "unreasonable". As
may be seen, however, the only "reasonable!' inequality in educational facilities is inequality
unavoidable because of the impossibility of mathematically exact duplication.
iI8 U. S. 356, 370, 6 Sup. Ct. io64, io7i (1885).
As expressed in Ward v. Flood, supra note 3, at 50, "The clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment . . . did not create any new or substantive legal right or add to or enlarge
the general classification of rights of persons or things existing in any state under the laws
thereof . . . it declared in substance that, such as they were in each state, they should be
held and enjoyed alike by all persons within its jurisdiction." Cf. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.
S. 73, 52 Sup. Ct. 484 (1932) ; (I933) 8i U. OF PA. L. REV. 769.
' Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. 198 (2849).
' Cases supra note 3; People v. Gallagher, supra note i; Lehew v. Brummel, 103 Mo.
546, I5 S. W. 765 (i89i) ; Dameron v. Bayless, 14 Ariz. i8o, 126 Pac. 273 (912). But see
Board of Education v. Tinnon, 26 Kan. 2, 22 (1881).
-' Bertonneau v. Board of Directors, Fed. Cas. No. 1, 361, at 296 (C. C. D. La. 1878);
cf. United States v. Buntin, io Fed. 730 (S. D. Ohio, 1882); Wong Him v. Callahan, ng
Fed. 381 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 192). For early federal approval of state decisions on separate
schools see Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485, 504 (877).
2275 U. S. 78, 48 Sup. Ct. 9 (I927).
D. C. CODE (1929) tit. 7, §§ 7, 8, 41, 248.
"W. VA. CoNsT. §8, art. 12; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, i93o) § 680; TEx. CoNsT. § 7,
art. VI; S. C. CoNsT. §7, art. XI; S. C. Caim. CODE (1932) § 54o6; TENN. CONST. § 12, art.
XI; ALA. CONST. § 256, art. XIV; Miss. CODE ANN. (2930) § 6586; GA. CONST. § i, art.
VIII; GA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1926) §§ 6576, 255, (II8).
31 Infra notes 56, 57, 58, 59. It is interesting to note the clearly erroneous dictum in Mar-
tin v. Board of Education, 42 W. Va. 514, 515, :26 S. E. 348, 349 (1896) to the effect that it
would be unconstitutional to force both races to attend the same public school.
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tunate as this may be, it is for the sociologist to discover the best plan and for an
enlightened people to accept it. The courts have but one answer: "This preju-
dice, if it exists, is not created by law and probably cannot be changed by law."
Surely, in a democracy, that which goes beyond the temperament of a people is
not law but philosophy.
It has been argued forcibly that although separation is not inequality, it
certainly provides an opportunity for inequality which an identity of facilities
would deny. The meaning of "equal school advantages", and the substantive re-
quirements of equality demanded in order for segregation to be constitutional
must next be considered. 3
There has been no hesitation in declaring unconstitutional a statute providing
for an agricultural high school for white pupils where none was provided for
negroes. 34 This principle has been extended to compel the admission of a colored
pupil into a "white" state high school even though an equal school was available
through the federal government.35  More specifically, from the point of view of
the negro taxpayer, a court has said:
"We agree with counsel for the plaintiff that equal protection means,
not only equal taxation, but equal benefits of the taxes . . . collected, and
we are of the opinion that if the facts . . . would warrant a finding such
method as provided in Section 10574 . . . would fail to provide sufficient
funds [for] . . . separate schools [negro] with accommodations equal to
those of the white schools . . . said section would be unconstitutional." 36
Whether or not the negro was afforded equal facilities would seem to be a
question for the jury,87 although courts will consider the evidence and set aside
the verdict if they think it necessary., Inconvenience to an individual arising
from the location of the negro school has consistently been declared insufficient
to support charges of inequality 9 although if the location is such as to make the
school dangerous or inconvenient for all the pupils, constitutional requirements
of equal facilities are not satisfied.40  Differences in the size of the school
buildings 41 or in the amount of appropriations 42 are no ground for complaint
where it appears that the number of pupils is in proportion.
' Ward v. Flood, spra note 3, at 56.
' As stated in Ward v. Flood, supra note 3, at 56, ". • . the exclusion of colored
children from schools where white children attend as pupils, cannot be supported, except
. where separate schools are actually maintained for the education of colored children;
and that, unless such separate schools be in fact maintained, all children . . . whether
white or colored, have an equal right to become pupils at any common school. . .
' McFarland v. Goins, 96 Miss. 67, 5o So. 493 (I909).
Piper v. Big Pine School Dist., 193 Cal. 664, 226 Pac. 926 (1924) (federal Indian
school did not relieve state of duty to provide equally).
' Jones v. Board of Education, go Okla. 233, 237, 217 Pac. 400, 403 (1923) in which
the court pointed out that the fault lay not in the statute which provided for adequate funds,
but in the Excise Board that by mandamus could be forced to collect the authorized
amount. See also Board of Education v. Excise Board, 86 Okla. :24, 206 Pac. 517 (1922).
"United States v. Buntin, supra note 27.
' People v. Mayor of Alton, 233 Ill. 542, 84 N. E. 664 (i9o8) appealed from 193 Ill. 309,
6I N. E. 1077 (1901) (case was returned to trial seven times).
' Lehew v. Brummel, supra note 26; People v. Gallagher, supra note i; Roberts v. City
of Boston, supra note 25.
" Williams v. Board of Education, 79 Kan. 2o2, 99 Pac. 216 (19o8) (negro school sur-
rounded by railroad tracks making more dangerous and so unequal) ; cf. Wright v. Board of
Education, 129 Kan. 852, 284 Pac. 363 (393o).
"Reynolds v. Board of Education, 66 Kan. 672, 692, 7z Pac. 274, 281 (19o3) ; Lowery
v. Kernsville School, 14o N. C. 33, 48, 52 S. E. 267, 272 (905).
"Chrisman v. City of Brookhaven, 70 Miss. 477, 12 So. 458 (1893) ($12,00o for white
schools and $3,000 for negro schools valid) ; cf. State v. Maryland Institute, 87 Md. 643, 41
Atl. 126 (1898).
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Some of the southern states have attempted to give to the requirement of
equality the meaning that if each race is taxed separately to support its own
schools justice will be done. Although, in one instance, this was supported where
the question was whether the races in a local community wished to supplement
the equally divided state funds,43 yet as a method of state taxation it has been
declared invalid by both federal and state courts. 44 To the superficial argument
that such a system gives to each race that which it can afford, the theory of
democratic government answers that citizens are equal before the law and the
services afforded by governmental agencies are not dependent upon the individual
financial standing of the recipients.
Unfortunately, actual equality in the face of an antagonistic attitude taken
by the state is almost impossible. Some courts have even admitted that a statute
was unconstitutional because of unequal facilities, but yet have consistently re-
fused to force the redistribution of funds already collected.45 One of the most
important cases, justified only upon this narrow remedial basis, is Cumming v.
Board of Education.4" In that case a negro high school was discontinued because
of lack of funds, it being claimed that the money was needed to teach the negroes
in the lower grades. Although the high school for white pupils was maintained
with all the usual accommodations, the Court refused to order "white" funds to
be used for colored schools, and said that
". .. if it appeared that the Board's refusal to maintain such a school
was in fact an abuse of its discretion and in hostility to the colored population
because of their race, different questions might have arisen in the state
court." 47
Here is a new test: not mere factual inequality, but inequality motivated by race
hostility. This test is not sound. What other reason could be given for reducing
only the facilities of the negro except that the board believed his rights inferior,
his educational needs less important? To the argument that they could not afford
a negro high school, logic, constitutional theory and justice answer: that which
you can not afford for negroes, you can not afford for white pupils either,
It is clear that, where the goal is equal school facilities, declaring a statute
unconstitutional is too often an empty victory if it affects only future appro-
priations. State statutes are so variously interpreted that an adequate remedy
is rarely certain. Although, in some southern states, the statutes impose upon
administrative officers a duty to distribute funds sufficiently definite to be en-
forceable by mandamus, 48 yet the probability is that, in most states, the statute,
' Crosby v. Mayfield, 133 Ky. 215, 117 S. W. 316 (19o9).
"Claybrook v. Owensboro, 16 Fed. 297, 23 Fed. 634 (C. C. D. Ky. 1884); Dawson v.
Lee, 83 Ky. 49 (1884). Under state constitutions: Puitt v. Gaston County, 94 N. C. 709
(1886); Ruggsbee v. Town of Durham, 94 N. C. 8oo (1886).
' Jones v. Board of Education, supra note 36; Claybrook v. Owensboro, supra note 44;
Davenport v. Cloverport, 72 Fed. 689 (D. Ky. 1896).
46 175 U. S. 528, 20 Sup. Ct. 197 (1899).
41 Id. at 545, 20 Sup. Ct. at 2Ol, where Justice Harlan also said, ". . . while all admit
that the burdens of public taxation must be shared by citizens without discrimination against
any class on account of their race, the education of the public in schools maintained by state
taxation is a matter belonging to the respective states". This seems to be merely a restate-
ment of the Court's conclusion and an avoidance of the issue.
8 OKLA. CONsT. §§ I, 3, art. 13; Board of Education v. Excise Board, supra note 36;
ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1927) § 88M8; Merritt v. School Dist., 54 Ark. 468, 16
S. W. 287 (1891) ; Dist. No. 4 v. Dist. No. 84, 93 Ark. 109, 124 S. W. 238 (1909) ; ALA.
CoNsT. (Michie, 1928) §§ 256, 270; ALA. SCHOOL CODE (1927) §§ 42, 79, 121, 167, 199, 241,
242, 253; State v. White, 116 Ala. 202, 23 So. 31 (1896) ; State v: Board of Education, 214
Ala. 62o, 1o8 So. 588 (1926); FLA. Comp. LAws (Supp. 1930) § 508 (I); Chamberlain v.
City of Tampa, 4o Fla. 74, 23 So. 572 (1898) ; cf. FLA. CoMp. LAWS (1927) §§ 561, 700-711.
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because of less definite terminology, permits such wide discretion that the official
is not subject to judicial mandate.4 9 It has been suggested that if the negro pupil
should apply for admission into the "white" school, the issue would then be
whether that equality upon which lawful segregation depends has been main-
tained.50 It is upon this theory that two young colored men recently applied for
admission into the state maintained law school of North Carolina; the practical
remedy is not so much admission, but the providing for a legal education in some
other manner."'
Finally, it is of interest to note that although the federal government has
several times provided for appropriations of land and money to the states to aid
education, 52 only one of these grants is specifically predicated upon an equal and
fair distribution to both races. 53 The states in receiving these grants have treated
them differently. Three at least require that half go to the negro, 4 while one
leaves it to the discretion of the board of education to carry out the intention of
Congress."
Should the discussion end at this point, it would have covered the major
controversies under the Fourteenth Amendment, but it would portray but half
of the national picture of the legal status of negro education. Many northern
and western states have gone far beyond the Constitution in trying to destroy
the barriers of color, and to balance the one extreme of prohibiting the teaching
of both races in the same private school, a court in Colorado interpreted the
state constitution as granting not only social equality but social identity." It
might be well to summarize a few of the decisions under state provisions.
The only important problem raised is whether separate negro schools are
lawful. It has been held that where the state law provides that "all shall have
the equal right to attend any school", 57 or that no child "shall be excluded from
"ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, i92I) § 8915; State v. Donaghey, io6 Ark. 56,
152 S. W. 746 (1912) ; Jobe v. Urquhart, 1O2 Ark. 47o, 143 S. W. 121 (192) ; McBride v.
Ron, 82 Ark. 483, 102 S. W. 389 (1907) ; GA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1926) §§ 155, (8),
1551 (140), 6576; Board of Education v. Cumming, lO3 Ga. 641, 29 S. E. 488 (1898) (case
on appeal discussed supra note 46) ; cf. Clark v. Cline, 123 Ga. 856, 51 S. E. 617 (195o).
MISS. CODE ANN. (i3o) §§ 6557 (3), 6664 (6) ; Shotwell v. Covington, 69 Miss. 735, 12 So.
26o (1892) ; Board of Ed. v. City of West Point, 50 Miss. 638, 643 (1874) ; Board of Super-
visors v. State, 63 Miss. 135 (1885); S. C. CoNsr. (1895) §7; S. C. CIv. CODE (1922)
§§ 2593, 2594; State v. Hiers, 51 S. C. 388, 29 S. E. 89 (1897).
As for the remedy by suit on official bond where definite duty is violated see ALA. ScHOOL
CODE (1927) §§ 66, 147, 174-197, 298; ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) § 8176;
GA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1926) §§ 12, 291, 299, 155, (6I), 1551 (168) ; S. C. CODE (1922)
§ 745; Gay v. Bankston, IOO Ala. 280, 13 So. 939 (1893) ; City of Richland v. Owens, 86 S.
C. 545, 68 S. E. 753 (91o).
I Preliminary Report by attorney, Nathan R. Margold, New York City, to the Joint
Committee of the American Fund for Public Service and the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People.
Greensboro, N. C., Daily News, Feb. 13, 1933, at I.
m7 U. S. C. A. §§3oi, 304 (1927) (land) ; 20 U. S. C. A. §§ II, 12, 13, 14, 15 (,927).
G7 U. S. C. A. §§321 to 328 (1927).
r'MISS. CODE ANN. (1930) §§7184, 7196; S. C. CIv. CODE (1922) §§2819, 2824, 2825;
FLA. ComP. LAws (3927) §§ 814, 847.
1 GA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 3926) § 155, (203) ; cf. AIA. CODE (Michie, 1928) § 496;
ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1927) §§ 878o, 8989, 886, 88o8; LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
(Marr, 1915) §§ 2712, 2723, 2741, 2753).
I Jones v. Newlon, 81 Colo. 25, 253 Pac. 386 (1927). A resolution of the superintendent
of schools requiring separate social functions was held to violate art. 9, sec. 8 of the state con-
stitution which reads: " . . . Nor shall any distinctions or classifications of pupils be made
on account of race or color".
" People ex rel. Workman v. Board of Education of Detroit, 18 Mich. 400 (1869).
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any public school . .. on account of .. . color",58 "nor shall any distinctions
or classifications of pupils be made on account of race or color", 9 then separate
negro schools are illegal. On the other hand, where the terms demand that schools
be "equal . .. open to all",60 "uniform and common","' with "equal participa-
tion",6 2 the courts have upheld race segregation. Some courts merely declare
that the board of education may not separate unless specifically authorized.63  One
court held that the requirement that schools be "equal to all youths" justified
mandamus to compel the admission of a negro pupil into a "white" school.
0 4
Although in the past New York has upheld race separation in schools, 5 recent
statutes and decisions would seem to require more careful examination.68
In conclusion it should be remembered that segregation alone is not the
primary legal problem of present day negro education; the legality of separate
schools depends only upon state statutes which are, in turn, the result of two
conflicting social policies. The important and vital problem is how can the negro
enforce the actual equality in educational facilities to which he is entitled under
the Constitution? The evasive tactics of many courts which recognize the sub-
stantive right but confess themselves without an immediate remedy for its viola-
tion is certainly to be deplored. The manner in which the Supreme Court of the
United States has handled the few cases on the subject which it has been asked to
consider, and its analysis, implying that equality between races is a matter of
"discretion" with state authorities, and inequality justified as long as it is not
"hostile", are most unsatisfactory.6" It is sincerely hoped that the Court will
soon be afforded the opportunity to repudiate such theory, and to apply to state
education the constitutional principle of equality before the law in fairness to a
race so greatly dependent upon public instruction for its advancement.
E.J.R.
'State ex rel. Pierce v. Union School Trustees, 46 N. J. L. 76 (1884) ; Patterson v.
Board of Education of Trenton, ii N. J. Misc. 179, 164 Atl. 892 (933) (separate swimming
classes unlawful).
' Jones v. Newlon, supra note 56; cf. People v. Board of Education, 101 Ill. 308 (882).
In Pennsylvania, the statute is practically the same. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930)
tit. 24, § 1377; PA. SCHOOL CODE (193I) § 1405, with the same interpretation, Kaine v. Com-
monwealth, IOI Pa. 490 (1882), although the question whether the separation is on the basis
of color or the result of school districting is for the jury, Mayo v. Morton School Dist., 72
Pa. Super. 247 (1919) ; Taylor v. Entriken, 214 Pa. 303, 63 Atl. 6o6 (igo6).
Cory v. Carter, supra note 3.
'Reynolds v. Board of Education, supra note 41.
"State v. City of Cincinnati, ig Ohio 178 (185o) ; cf. Van Camp v. Board of Education,
9 Ohio St. 406 (1859).
"Stoutmeyer v. Duffy, 7 Nev. 342, 346 (1872) (constitution: "uniform system of com-
mon schools") ; Woodbridge v. Board of Education, 98 Kan. 397, 157 Pac. 1184 (ii6).
"Clark v. Board of Directors, 24 Iowa 266 (1868).
"People v. Gallagher, supra note i; People v. Queens School Board, 161 N. Y. 598, 56
N. E. 81 (19oo) decided under N. Y. PENAL LAW (1928) § 514; cf. N. Y. EDUCATION LAW
(1928) §§ 920, 921.
6 Mr. Nathan R. Margold in his Report, supra note 5o, believes that separate schools
might well be attacked. See especially McKaine v. Drake Business School, 107 Misc. 241,
x76 N. Y. Supp. 33 (I919), and N. Y. CiviL RIGHTS LAW (Supp. 1932) § 40.
" Contrast the attitude of the Court in the Cummings case, supra note 46, with that in the
cases of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, supra note 23, and Buchanan v. Warley, supra note 19.
